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P aying interest on reserves
would increase the demand for
deposits and thus for reserves.
This, in turn, would raise the
value of existing reserves,
increasing the wealth of those
who own bank deposits at
the time that interest
payments are initiated.
The case for payments of interest on re-
serves applies not only to the 100% reserve
system, but equally to our present fractional
reserve system. Accordingly, even if re-
serves are not raised to 100%, Reserve Banks
should be required to pay interest on their
deposit liabilities.
—Milton Friedman
A Program for Monetary Stability
As the introductory quote indicates, Milton
Friedman (1959), among others, has advocated
paying interest on reserves.1 In the United States
and many other countries, banks and other fi-
nancial intermediaries are required to hold a
fraction of their assets as fiat money—unbacked,
interest-free bills of the central bank. In the
absence of interest on these reserves, the aver-
age return to assets held by banks must lie
below the market rate of return. This implies
that banks must pay their depositors a return
below the market rate of interest, unnecessarily
discouraging the holding of bank deposits. Be-
cause such intervention into the business of
banking is so common, basic questions about
the desirability of such requirements may easily
be overlooked. For instance, by forcing banks to
hold unbacked assets paying no interest, might
the central bank be discouraging banking and
the accumulation of capital?
But where would the interest come from?
As with any government expenditure, interest
paid on reserves must (at least eventually) come
from taxes, raising two questions: Wouldn’t
wealth be reduced by the rise in taxes? Wouldn’t
taxation introduce its own economic distortions,
possibly worse than those that result from the
absence of interest?
Paying interest on reserves would increase
the demand for deposits and thus for reserves.
This, in turn, would raise the value of existing
reserves, increasing the wealth of those who
own bank deposits at the time that interest
payments are initiated. Bruce Smith (1991) shows
that this windfall gain to those holding deposits
at the time the policy is enacted comes at the
expense of future generations; that is, future
generations must pay the taxes to finance the
interest payments but do not receive all of the
resulting benefits. Thus, Smith shows that the
transfer of wealth created by the payment of
interest makes future generations worse off.
In this article, we propose a means of
eliminating this transfer. We begin by discussing
the role reserve requirements play in a simple
economy. People finance the next period’s con-
sumption by holding deposits. The key feature26
of the model is that reserve requirements force
banks to hold fiat money as fractional backing
for deposits. The merits of paying interest on
reserves will be clear if the government offsets
the wealth transfer identified by Smith.
Our idea for an offsetting transfer is adapted
from a policy proposed by Leonardo Auernheimer
(1974).2 When interest on reserves is initiated,
the central bank should expand the stock of
nominal reserves to keep the price level from
decreasing. If the central bank uses this increase
in the money stock to purchase interest-bearing
assets (an open market operation), the interest
generated by these assets can help pay for the
interest paid on reserves, lowering the tax bur-
den on future generations. We argue that paying
interest on reserves, when accompanied by the
appropriate open market operation, can make
every future generation better off without hurt-
ing initial deposit holders.
We also take up the second of our nettle-
some questions: Would taxation introduce its
own economic distortions? The taxes available
to government in the real world are generally ad
valorem taxes; the amount of tax collected is set
at some fraction of an economic variable, such
as income or sales. Ad valorem taxes artificially
discourage the taxed activity, just as the absence
of interest on reserves discourages deposits at
banks. We show that despite this tax-induced
distortion, we can make people unambiguously
better off by paying interest on reserves. This
improvement occurs even if the interest must
be funded by a tax used in the real world—
a distorting ad valorem tax on capital—if this
tax is accompanied by a price-stabilizing open
market purchase.
In sum, our questions about the costs of
paying interest on reserves are fairly straight-
forward to resolve. Both capital taxation and
open market operations are widely used real-
world policy options. Therefore, there exists a
way to finance the payment of interest on re-
serves that will make the public unambiguously
better off.
A model of reserve requirement banking
To address these questions, let us examine
a simple model adapted from the framework
shared by David Romer (1985), Thomas Sargent
and Neil Wallace (1985), Scott Freeman (1987),
and Smith (1991) in which financial intermediar-
ies that mobilize capital are subject to a reserve
requirement.
In each period, starting from some initial
period 1, N people who live two periods are
born. Each produces y goods when young and
nothing when old, but wishes to consume in
both periods of life. The problem facing these
people is the means of financing consump-
tion in the second period of life. There is also
a generation that lives and consumes only in
the initial period, hereafter referred to as the
“initial old.”
In the first period of this model economy,
there is a fixed stock of M (divisible) pieces of
paper called fiat money. In addition to money,
there are also two forms of capital. The first form
is available to any individual in isolation. An
investment of kt goods in period t will produce
f (kt) consumption goods in period t + 1. The
marginal product of capital, which we express
as f ′(k), is positive but decreasing. The second
form of capital produces a constant x consump-
tion goods (x > 1) in period t + 1 for each good
invested at t. This latter form of capital can be
made only in amounts greater than y so that no
individual alone has the resources to finance
capital. Both forms of capital produce consump-
tion goods only once.
Note that the second form of capital is
illiquid in this economy because it cannot be
divided into small units. It is easy to see how an
intermediary can overcome this illiquidity by
simply pooling the deposits of many individuals
to an amount greater than y. We assume for
simplicity that the intermediation services are
costlessly and competitively provided by entities
referred to as “banks.” 3
In this economy, we assume that a reserve
requirement is imposed: for each good de-
posited, a bank must hold fiat money worth γ
goods but is free to invest the remaining 1 – γ
goods in the illiquid, or intermediated, capital
good.4 (We assume throughout this analysis
that the initial old hold positive quantities of
both unintermediated capital and deposits.) If
fiat money’s rate of return is less than that of
capital, banks will hold no more than the re-
quired balances of fiat money. Suppose, for
now, that banks do not hold any excess re-
serves. (We will verify shortly that this is a wise
decision.) If st denotes deposits per young per-
son, then banks will hold fiat money balances
worth  γNst goods. Those required reserves
represent the total demand for fiat money
measured in goods. The supply of fiat money
is M dollars or, when measured in goods, vtM,
where vt represents the goods that can be pur-
chased by a single dollar. The goods value of
a dollar is simply the inverse of the dollar price
(pt) of one good, or vt = 1/pt. Furthermore, the
gross real rate of return from holding fiat money
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in period t + 1 to the goods purchased by a
single dollar in the current period, or vt+1/vt.
For the demand for fiat money to equal its
supply,
(1) γNst = vtM.
Notice that when deposits, st, are constant over
time, the demand for fiat money is constant over
time. Therefore, when the stock of fiat money is
also constant over time, the value of a dollar and
the price level will both be constant over time. It
follows that the gross real rate of return of a
dollar, vt+1/vt, equals 1.5
What, then, will be the rate of return of-
fered by competitive banks? Assuming for sim-
plicity that intermediation services are costlessly
provided by banks in a competitive market, then
banks will offer depositors the rate of return that
the banks can earn on the assets they hold. This
(gross, real) rate of return (call it R) is
(2) R = (1 – γ)x + γ
because for each good deposited, the bank can
invest (1 – γ) in capital paying the rate of return
x and purchase γ in fiat money paying the rate
of return 1. Notice in equation 2 that increasing
the reserve requirement lowers the rate of return
on deposits by forcing banks to hold more low-
return fiat money per deposit. Clearly, every
subsequent generation suffers from this lower
rate of return on their deposits. Moreover, with
x > 1, equation 2 indicates that the bank best
serves its depositors by not holding reserves in
excess of those required.
People will invest in the asset paying the
better rate of return. This implies that the people
who hold both deposits and unintermediated
capital will invest in unintermediated capital
up to the point that its marginal rate of return
just equals the rate of return offered by inter-
mediaries:
(3) f ′(k) = (1 – γ)x + γ.
Because an increase in the reserve require-
ment lowers the return on intermediated capital,
people switch from deposits to unintermediated
capital. This switching occurs until the rate of
return on unintermediated capital falls to equal
the new lower rate of return on deposits.
Figure 1 illustrates the basic point made
in equation 3. The desired savings curve plots
the quantity of savings for next-period con-
sumption at different rates of return. The rate of
return on the vertical axis is equal to the rate
offered by competitive banks and is determined
by the returns on intermediated capital and
reserves. The horizontal line emanating from
the value x(1 – γ) + γ on the vertical axis in
Figure 1 is the return on deposits. For a given
Figure 1
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level of savings, the distribution between inter-
mediated and unintermediated capital depends
on the assumption that the return on uninter-
mediated capital falls with each additional unit
of this form of capital. Figure 1 captures this
feature by representing the f′(k) curve as a
downward sloping line. From equation 3, people
add units of unintermediated capital up to
the point at which the return offered by banks
equals the return on unintermediated capital.
This occurs at point A in Figure 1. The horizon-
tal distance between the vertical axis and point
A measures how much unintermediated capital
people will choose. The difference between
desired savings and unintermediated capital—
the horizontal distance between total goods
saved and point A—measures the quantity of
deposits.
An additional implication of equation 3
seen in Figure 1 is that with reserve require-
ments, the output produced by one more unit of
unintermediated capital, f ′(k), is less than the
output from a unit of intermediated capital, x.6
Therefore, by encouraging people to switch
from intermediated capital to unintermediated
capital, a reserve requirement reduces output
for each good switched. More generally, higher
reserve requirements discourage total savings
because of the lower rates of return offered on
both unintermediated capital and deposits.
Figure 2 illustrates the effects an increase in
reserve requirements has on savings and each
form of capital.
There is, we should note, a group that
benefits from the imposition of a reserve re-
quirement: the initial old. By assumption, this
group starts with a portfolio of assets that in-
clude fiat money. If reserve requirements were
removed, this fiat money would have no value.
Consequently, the value of the initial old’s port-
folio would fall. Alternatively, increasing the
reserve requirement increases the demand for
fiat money, making each dollar more valuable
and raising the welfare of the initial old by
raising the value of fiat money (see equation 1).
In short, the reserve requirement transfers wealth
from all future generations to the initial old.
The central bank can increase the rate of
return on deposits if it increases the rate of
return on fiat money by, for example, paying
interest on required reserves. This will increase
the rate of return paid to depositors, but will it
make them better off? As we demonstrate in the
next section, the answer depends on how this
higher rate of return is financed.
A case with interest payments on reserves
In this section, we consider how different
financing schemes affect the desirability of pay-
ing interest on reserves. Paying interest on re-
serves will be deemed desirable if at least one
group is made better off while no other group is
Figure 2
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harmed. In the model outlined above, the groups
can be identified using the date at which the
policy is implemented as the reference point;
thus, the two groups that come to mind are
those already holding money when the policy is
implemented (the initial old) and the future
generations.
The central bank as an intermediary. Con-
sider first a policy that would have the govern-
ment pay the interest from interest-bearing assets
of the central bank. Suppose that instead of
leaving the initial stock of central bank money in
the hands of the initial old, the central bank
takes it and uses it to purchase (intermediated)
capital. This gives the central bank ownership of
a stock of capital. (We focus our attention here
on an equilibrium in which the stocks of re-
serves, central bank capital, and the value of
money are constant over time.) Formally, the
central bank’s balance sheet constraint is
(4) K g = vM,
where Kg is an interest-bearing asset that repre-
sents the value of capital held by the central
bank.7 The central bank will pay interest on its
liability, reserves (central bank money), using
the return on this capital net of its replacement
cost, xKg – Kg = (x – 1)Kg. If ρ denotes the
nominal net interest paid on a dollar of reserves,
then the interest paid on reserves equals ρvM,
implying that each period the central bank’s
budget requires
(5) (x – 1)K g = ρvM.
Because the central bank owns capital exactly
equal to the value of reserves (K g = vM ), the
central bank can offer interest on reserves equal
to the net return of capital:
(6) ρ = (x – 1),
which implies that the gross rate of return on
reserves, 1 + ρ, is x. Because the central bank
backs its money with capital, reserves pay the
same rate of return as other interest-bearing
assets owned by private banks. Under this plan,
the central bank has become an intermediary
paying market interest rates to its depositors
(private banks). Therefore, depositors at private
banks will no longer care what fraction of their
deposits is required to go into reserves. The
gross rate of return on deposits is now
(7) R = (1 – γ)x + γ (1 + ρ)
= (1 – γ)x + γx = x,
which equals the gross rate of return on capital
regardless of the size of the reserve requirement.
For any positive reserve requirement, all future
generations are made better off by this plan to
pay interest on reserves because they are of-
fered a higher rate of return on their deposits.
Would anyone oppose such a plan to pay
interest on reserves from central bank capital?
Yes, the initial old would. Notice that this fi-
nancing scheme begins with the central bank
confiscating the initial old’s money balances with-
out any compensation. Such a tax collection
scheme reduces the wealth holdings of the ini-
tial old, reducing their consumption.
The payment of interest on reserves from
central bank capital has the same welfare effects
as abandoning reserve requirements. In both
cases, future generations receive a better rate of
return (x) on their deposits, but the initial old
lose the value of their initial balances of fiat
money.
There are three differences between aban-
doning reserve requirements and confiscating
the initial old’s money balances. First, when
reserve requirements are simply abandoned, all
fiat money becomes worthless.8 Under central
bank intermediation, however, there is still a
demand for reserves, and the value of a dollar is
again determined by the equality of supply and
demand for reserves set forth in equation 1. As
we have shown, banks will hold zero excess
reserves, so that
(8) γNs = vM.
Second, the model economy described
above specifies that intermediated capital al-
ways returns x units of the consumption good
for every one unit invested. It is not difficult to
imagine a situation in which returns are related
to the quality of the investment decisions made.
Under central bank intermediation, we entrust a
governmental body, the central bank, with in-
vestment decisions. The central bank may not
be motivated by maximization of profits. Conse-
quently, if the central bank does not choose as
wisely as private banks, the return offered on
reserves may be below the market rate of return.
Of course, one way to remove the investment
decision from the purview of the central bank is
to open the discount window. Banks could bor-
row funds at the market rate of return and make
the investment decisions. Then the central bank’s
only responsibility would be to restrict its lend-
ing to sound banks.
Third, we have thus far assumed that inter-
mediation services are costlessly provided. A30
more realistic assumption recognizes that costs,
such as those of record-keeping, are associated
with creating private intermediary services. With
central bank intermediation, there is a second
level of record-keeping; people make deposits
at banks and then banks make deposits (hold
reserves) at the central bank. If it is costly to
keep records and otherwise manage deposits,
the total of these costs will be higher under this
two-level system of intermediation than under
the one-level setup.
Tax-financed interest on reserves. Suppose
that the central bank wants to finance interest on
reserves without hurting the initial old. It can do
so if each future generation is taxed to pay the
interest.9 Would the benefits of the increased
rate of return exceed the cost of the taxation?
Increasing the rate of return on deposits would
increase deposits and thus capital, as desired.
The increased deposits, however, also increase
the demand for reserves. Greater demand for
fiat money increases the value of the initial
reserves owned by the initial old. (Note from
equation 1, the equality of supply and demand
for reserves implies that v = γNs/M. Clearly, an
increase in s will increase v.) In effect, the taxes
paid by future generations go to pay interest on
reserves and to increase the wealth of the initial
old. Smith (1991) demonstrates that this transfer
of wealth from the future generations to the
initial generation lowers the welfare of the fu-
ture generations despite the greater rate of re-
turn on deposits. To understand this result, note
that the taxes paid by people in the future
generations are exactly equal to the value of the
interest payments received on reserves. These
two changes to lifetime wealth, therefore, ex-
actly cancel each other out. However, the policy
has a side effect: the reserves that the initial
generation owns and that subsequent genera-
tions need have been made more expensive.
This transfers wealth from subsequent genera-
tions to the initial old. Therefore, the central
bank cannot increase the welfare of the future
generations simply by financing interest on re-
serves through pay-as-you-go taxation.
Auernheimer (1974) suggests a way to fi-
nance the payment of interest on reserves with-
out hurting or helping the initial old.10 The initial
old gain under the tax plan just described be-
cause of an increase in the value of their initial
money balances. The value of money can be
brought back to its initial level if the central
bank prints more money, such that the increased
demand for money is exactly matched by an
increased supply of money. How can a plan
featuring taxes and accommodating money sup-
ply increases help the future generations? Let the
central bank use the increase in the stock of its
money to buy capital. The central bank’s ex-
change of (intermediated) capital for fiat money
is an open market purchase. The additional
capital can then be used to help finance the
payment of interest on reserves, lessening the
tax burden of future generations. Freeman and
Haslag (forthcoming) show that this tax-financed
interest on reserves makes the future genera-
tions better off. (A formal proof is also presented
in the appendix.) The higher rate of return on
deposits encourages savings through banks at its
optimal level, without a transfer of wealth from
the future generations to the initial owners of
money. In short, the future generations pay
enough taxes to finance the interest payments
on reserves but do not pay for a transfer to the
initial old.
A case with distortionary taxes
The financing scheme outlined above is
based on a lump-sum tax. The desirability of
taxing to pay interest on reserves may no longer
hold if the tax, like many real-world taxes, itself
distorts individual incentives. An income tax, for
example, may well reduce incentives to work
and invest, therefore causing more economic
distortion than the absence of interest on re-
serves. To address this concern, we now exam-
ine the payment of interest on reserves financed
by a tax commonly used in the real world, a tax
on capital. We show that people are better off
with interest paid on reserves, even if it must be
financed by a tax that discourages the holding of
capital.
Consider, in particular, a tax applied against
the return from both types of capital; that is, the
payment of interest on reserves is to be financed
by a tax of α times the return to both intermedi-
ated and unintermediated capital. As with the
lump-sum case described above, we assume
that the government conducts an open market
purchase that keeps the price level constant.
Thus, the net interest on the government’s capi-
tal goods plus revenue from the capital tax is
equal to the government’s net interest on re-
serves.
The question is whether interest-bearing
required reserves are welfare-improving when
financed with a distortionary capital tax. Free-
man and Haslag (forthcoming) and the appen-
dix to this article show that the total net return to
the future generations is increased when the
government pays interest on required reserves,
even if the interest is financed by a tax on
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The intuition behind this result is fairly
straightforward. If reserves pay no interest, a
reserve requirement directly distorts the return
to intermediated capital. In this way, the reserve
requirement is like a tax on the return to inter-
mediated capital, while unintermediated capital
is not directly taxed. Paying the market rate of
interest on reserves means that deposits earn the
same return as unintermediated capital, ending
the discouragement of deposits resulting from
the lower return from required reserves. Taxing
both intermediated and unintermediated capital
at the same rate spreads the distortion equally,
and thus efficiently, across the two types of
capital. In short, people do not make investment
choices between the two forms of capital based
on after-tax returns. When taxes are applied
equally, both the pre- and after-tax returns are
equalized. The gain from the increased return
on deposits more than offsets the lower after-tax
return on unintermediated capital. Consequently,
future generations have a higher total return
than when the return of only one type of capital
is distorted.11
The payment of interest on reserves en-
courages people to marginally substitute inter-
mediated capital for unintermediated capital. For
each extra unit of intermediated capital, x goods
are produced, while an extra unit of uninter-
mediated capital produces f ′(k) goods. We have
seen that when intermediated capital is subject
to reserve requirements without interest, f ′(k) =
(1 – γ)x + γ = x – (x – 1)γ, which is less than x.
Therefore, when people switch one unit of sav-
ings from unintermediated capital to intermedi-
ated capital, more output is gained (x) from the
increase in intermediated capital than is lost
[f ′(k)] from the drop in unintermediated capital.
Therefore, there is more overall output and
greater welfare when interest is paid on re-
serves. Output and welfare would be even greater
if the interest could be funded by lump-sum
taxes, but stuck as we are with distorting taxes,
the payment of interest on reserves is still an
improvement.
Conclusions
In this article, we demonstrate how alter-
native schemes to finance interest payments on
required reserves will affect people. We con-
sider four different schemes: directly taxing
initial required reserves, a lump-sum tax on
future generations, and two financing schemes
that are accompanied by open market pur-
chases—lump-sum taxes and capital taxes.
We show that using lump-sum taxes ac-
commodated by an open market purchase to
finance interest-bearing reserves will avoid some
of the pitfalls associated with either directly
taxing initial required reserves or the lump-sum
tax alone. When open market purchases accom-
pany the payment of interest on reserves, mem-
bers of the future generations are better off
while the initial old are unaffected. Clearly, this
makes society better off. We further show that
paying interest on reserves is strictly better than
not paying interest, even if the taxes are
distortionary. This last result underscores the
distortionary effect associated with reserve re-
quirements. Spreading the distortion across both
types of capital—in the spirit of the Ramsey rule
of efficient taxation—raises welfare.
A key feature of the welfare improvement
is the accommodating open market purchase
suggested by Auernheimer. The payment of in-
terest on reserves effects a transfer from future
generations to the initial old. This transfer can
be exactly offset by an open market purchase.
The assets thus purchased can then be used to
help finance the payment of interest. Such an
accommodation is not beyond the central bank’s
normal operations. Indeed, Haslag and Hein
(1995, 1989) provide evidence that the Federal
Reserve systematically accommodates changes
in reserve requirements with open market op-
erations.
Overall, the main purpose of this article is
to demonstrate that paying interest on reserves
improves welfare in a broader class of model
economies than previously believed. We extend
the class of economies along two distinct lines.
For some time, people have recognized the
improvement that is possible in Friedman’s set-
ting with infinitely lived people and lump-sum
taxes. Smith raises questions about the desirabil-
ity of paying interest on reserves when the initial
(finite-lived) money holders benefit but are not
taxed. Our first extension shows that welfare
improvement is still possible in this economy if
a simple coordinated financing scheme is
adopted. The second extension shows that pay-
ing interest on reserves can improve people’s
welfare, even if the interest is funded through
distortionary taxes.
Notes
1 George Tolley (1957) also argues that the central bank
should pay interest on reserves. Joshua Feinman
(1993) traces the historical evolution of reserve re-
quirements in the U.S. banking system. Feinman also
notes that the Federal Reserve has explicitly supported
legislation authorizing the payment of interest on
reserves since the 1970s.
2 Auernheimer’s proposal is designed to offset changes32
in the demand for money induced by inflation rate
changes. Also see Phillippe Bacchetta and Ramon
Caminal (forthcoming), who apply the idea to reserve
requirement changes.
3 Certainly there are many other services provided by
banks, but this one is simple to model and adequate to
illustrate the points of this article. Other services of
banks are implicitly included in x.
4 In the United States, the requirement for checkable
deposits at large banks is currently 10 percent, or
γ = 0.10.
5 More generally, if the economy is growing at the gross
rate n (that is, Nt = nNt–1) and the fiat money stock is
growing at the gross rate z (that is, Mt = zMt –1), the
gross rate of return on a dollar will be n/z.
6 From equation 3, f ′(k) = x – (x – 1)γ < x.
7 The central bank could also buy bonds from private
banks, which would then use these funds to invest in
intermediated capital. This scheme is closer to actual
open market purchases but is equivalent in its effects
to the direct purchases of capital by the central bank.
8 This would not be true if there were an additional
demand for fiat money as currency (negotiable notes
passed from hand to hand). In most modern econo-
mies, the government retains a monopoly on the
issuance of currency by outlawing its issuance by
private banks backed by bank holdings of capital.
This is exactly equivalent to a reserve requirement
of 100 percent on currency.
9 This is the financing scheme associated with Fried-
man’s (1959) proposal and investigated by Smith
(1991).
10 Auernheimer (1974) describes just such a monetary
policy accommodation scheme in describing the
revenue-maximizing rate of inflation.
11 The idea that taxing all goods improves welfare is
discussed in Frank Ramsey’s (1927) rule for efficient
taxation. According to Ramsey, the government can
raise welfare by setting distortionary taxes such that
the percentage reduction in the quantity demanded of
each commodity is the same. In our setting, Ramsey’s
rule is implemented by taxing both types of capital
as opposed to taxing only one type. This result is
demonstrated by Peter Diamond and James Mirrlees
(1971) in a general setting. Diamond and Mirrlees
demonstrate that taxing an intermediate input is not
part of an optimal policy plan. In a monetary economy,
Kent Kimbrough (1989) shows that the Ramsey tax rule
applied to final goods improves welfare relative to a
case in which intermediate goods were taxed.
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In this appendix, we show more formally that
paying interest on reserves will make people better
off, even if the interest is financed with a distortion-
ary tax on capital. To do so, we must first calculate
the tax rate that would be needed to pay the market
rate of interest on reserves. We let S represent
total savings—deposits plus unintermediated
capital—per young person and use asterisks to in-
dicate values of variables in the absence of interest
on reserves. The government must finance net
interest on reserves of (x  – 1)γ(S – k) from taxes
on the return from savings, x(S – k) + f(k), and
from the interest on the capital it acquires from
the open market purchase in the initial period,
(x – 1)γ [(S – k) – (S* – k*)].
Altogether, this implies the government
budget constraint is
(A.1) (x – 1)γ(S – k) = x(S – k) + f(k)
+ (x – 1)γ[(S – k) – (S* – k*)],
or
(A.2) (x – 1)γ(S* – k*) = x(S – k) + f(k).
Paying interest on reserves makes future
generations better off if for any given level of
savings, S = S*, the total return net of taxes is
greater when interest is paid on reserves:
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(A.3) (1 – )x(S – k) + (1 – )f(k)
> [x(1 – γ) + γ](S – k*) + f(k*).
We can now use the government budget
constraint (equation A.2) to cancel several of the
tax terms with terms on the right-hand side of
equation A.3, leaving us with
(A.4) –xk + f(k) > –xk* + f(k*),
or
(A.5) x(k* – k) > f(k*) – f(k).
We know that k* > k because unintermediated
capital is taxed when interest is paid on reserves.
Because f(.) is a concave function (capital has a
diminishing marginal product),
(A.6) f ′(k)(k* – k) > f(k *) – f(k).
When interest is paid on reserves, we know that
the two forms of capital must offer the same
marginal rate of return; that is, f ′(k) = x. It follows
that the inequality (equation A.5) is satisfied,
proving that future generations are better off
with interest paid on reserves, even if it must be
financed through a distorting capital tax.